In addition, the CSF provides for special treatment for specific agreements which might otherwise infringe the prohibitions on vertical restraints (in particular the provisions on exclusive distribution, anti-competitive agreements and abuse of market power, but not on the maintenance of resale prices). These exceptions concern: is there a definition of "convention" – or equivalent – in the antitrust law of your jurisdiction? [paragraph 3.24] It is not necessary for a concerted agreement to contain an anti-competitive "provision", since it is the practice itself which has as its anti-competitive object, the effect or the intended effect. exclusion boycotts are not exempt from liability under the law after this separate prohibition is lifted; they can be taken as a form of cartel (as a behavior that relied on the limitation of production). Boycotts related to an agreement intended or resulting in a substantial reduction in competition may also be included in Article 45. Unlike antitrust rules, the parties do not need to compete. Accordingly, Section 45 will cover both horizontal and vertical agreements that significantly reduce competition, subject to certain exceptions and provisions to combat overlaps. If the anti-dominant rules do not apply (or otherwise) to relationships between lead agents, are there guidelines (or are there recent decisions of the administration) that constitute a lead agent relationship for these purposes? Will antitrust law be applied differently if the agreement containing the vertical restraint also contains provisions granting intellectual property rights (IPRs)? In addition to the general prohibition of abuse of market power, there is also a specific prohibition on foreclosure prices by undertakings with a significant market share. Under that prohibition, an undertaking which holds a `significant share in a contract` may not supply or offer goods or services for a `lasting period` at a price `below the relevant costs` of supplying the goods or services: such a restriction would be contrary to the CSF if it had as its object or likely effect: substantially reduce competition in a market (section 45) or lead to abuse. market power (§ 46). If necessary, the court will draw the necessary "head meetings" from clues such as evidence of joint actions, similar price structures or even evidence of the possibilities available to the parties to reach an agreement. Gallagher v Pioneer Concrete (NSW) Pty Ltd (1993) 113 ALR 159 Significant Reduction in Competition The Competition and Consumer Act is administered and enforced by the ACCC, although compliance with most sections may also be imposed by private measures.

The ACCC has become increasingly vigilant (and effective) in enforcing competition and consumer law. The ACCC refers serious anti-dominant conduct to the CDPP for criminal prosecution. For a company, a breach of the civil law prohibitions in Part IV of the Competition and Consumer Act (except for the prohibition of secondary boycotts) may result in the following penalties per infringement: up to AUD 10 million per infringement, i.e. three times the value of the benefit obtained from anti-competitive behaviour or, if the value of the benefit cannot be determined, 10% of the group`s annual turnover in Australia. For secondary boycotts, the maximum penalty is AUD 750,000. For a person, the criminal sanctions applicable to anti-cartel offences are penalties of up to 10 years` imprisonment and/or a fine of up to 2,000 criminal units (340,000 AUD). The penalty for a tort can be up to AUD500,000 per offense. A company (including its related entities) is prohibited from exempting its directors, officers or employees from any obligation to pay a fine and legal fees related to defending or opposing proceedings in which the person is held liable for a fine. . . .

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